{"id":1371,"date":"2026-09-29T17:01:03","date_gmt":"2026-09-29T20:01:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.onthenet.com.br\/?p=1371"},"modified":"2026-09-29T17:01:05","modified_gmt":"2026-09-29T20:01:05","slug":"rare-earths-china-us-brazil-global-rivalry","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.onthenet.com.br\/index.php\/en\/2026\/09\/29\/rare-earths-china-us-brazil-global-rivalry\/","title":{"rendered":"Rare Earths: The China\u2013US Rivalry Putting Brazil at the Center of the Contest"},"content":{"rendered":"

Billion-dollar deals, industrial dominance and mining in conflict zones explain the race for these elements. But what is actually documented about land purchases, organized crime and sanctions against Brazilians?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Explainer and documentary analysis \u2022 Reporting updated September 29, 2026<\/em><\/p>\n

An electric car can have its battery, software and body ready and still depend on a small component before leaving the factory: a magnet. Certain motor designs, as well as industrial equipment and wind turbines, use high-performance magnets made with elements whose names rarely appear in product advertising. Neodymium. Praseodymium. Dysprosium. Terbium.<\/p>\n

When supplies of these materials are interrupted, the consequences can cross continents. China’s 2025 export controls demonstrated that: automakers struggled to obtain magnets, and some operations temporarily reduced or halted production. The International Energy Agency documented that impact. Source: IEA, rare earth elements report<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Brazil has gained prominence in this contest. In September 2026, US-based USA Rare Earth reported completing its combination with Serra Verde, which owns a rare earth operation in Goi\u00e1s. The deal had been announced at approximately US$2.8 billion. A Brazilian deposit became part of a corporate effort to supply industry outside Asia. Sources: acquisition announcement<\/a> and completion announcement<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The story involves money, technology, sovereignty and territory. It also involves mining areas controlled by armed groups and a growing number of interpretations that mix facts with suspicions. Understanding what is at stake requires following the mineral\u2014and the documents.<\/p>\n

\"Samples<\/p>\n

Rare earth oxides: unassuming materials used in strategic industrial supply chains. Photo: Peggy Greb \/ USDA Agricultural Research Service, public domain. Source and rights information<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

A misleading name: rare earths are not a type of land<\/h2>\n

Rare earths are a group of 17 chemical elements: the 15 lanthanides on the periodic table, plus scandium and yttrium. They are not fertile soil, a category of rural property or a single substance extracted from a mine in a ready-to-use form.<\/p>\n

The adjective \u201crare\u201d can also mislead. Several of these elements are relatively abundant in Earth’s crust. The challenge is finding viable concentrations and separating elements with similar chemical behavior to obtain products that meet industrial specifications. A geological occurrence can be worth exploring without being able to support a commercial operation. Source: Geological Survey of Brazil<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Another essential distinction: lithium, niobium, copper, nickel and cobalt are not rare earths<\/strong>. They may be covered by critical or strategic mineral policies, but they belong to other groups. Calling every acquisition of a lithium or niobium mining company a \u201crare earth purchase\u201d distorts the debate.<\/p>\n

\u201cCritical\u201d is an economic and strategic classification related, among other factors, to a material’s importance and the vulnerability of its supply. \u201cRare earth\u201d identifies a family of elements. Brazil’s 2026 legislation adopts a definition of criticality that considers dependence on foreign suppliers, supply concentration and technological obstacles. Source: Law No. 15,506\/2026<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Why these elements mobilize governments and industries<\/h2>\n

The magnetic, optical and chemical properties of rare earths enable different applications. Some help produce magnets; others are used in luminescent materials, catalysts, specialty glass and medical technologies. The entire group does not share a single function. Source: Brazil’s Ministry of Mines and Energy<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Four names deserve particular attention in today’s industrial competition. Neodymium and praseodymium are used to manufacture high-performance magnets; dysprosium and terbium can improve characteristics such as resistance to demagnetization at high temperatures. Applications include certain electric motors, wind turbines and defense equipment. Source: IEA<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Strategic importance does not depend solely on the volume used. An input may account for a small fraction of a product’s mass or cost and still be indispensable to completing it. A factory’s problem is not necessarily having to pay more for the material: it may be unable to receive it on time and to the required specifications.<\/p>\n

Competition therefore involves both physical availability and the ability to ensure predictable deliveries. Long-term contracts and inventories can matter as much as opening a mine.<\/p>\n

China’s main advantage comes after mining<\/h2>\n

China did not become central to this market simply because it has mineral deposits. It built up processing capacity and component manufacturing.<\/p>\n

According to the IEA, using 2024 data for the rare earths used in magnets, China’s share was approximately 60% of mining and 91% of refining<\/strong>. Its share of sintered permanent magnet production reached 94%<\/strong>. These percentages refer to specific stages and market segments; they do not mean China owns 94% of the world’s reserves. Source: IEA analysis of industrial concentration<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The difference helps explain an apparent paradox: opening a mine outside China does not guarantee independence from China. The material may still need separation, refining or further processing at Chinese facilities.<\/p>\n

The chain runs from extraction to beneficiation, separation of the elements, production of metals and alloys, and magnet manufacturing. Each stage requires equipment, expertise and quality control. The IEA report identifies magnet manufacturing as one of the main obstacles to diversification. Source: IEA, supply chains and industrial capacity<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Whoever controls the steps between the rock and the industrial component can wield influence without owning the deposit.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Buying a mining company is not buying a country<\/h2>\n

The phrase \u201cChina and the United States are buying land\u201d lumps together very different transactions. These include property purchases, share acquisitions, transfers of corporate control, project financing and contracts that reserve future production for a buyer.<\/p>\n

In Brazil, owning land does not automatically confer ownership of mineral deposits. The Constitution distinguishes the land from mineral resources, which belong to the federal Union. Mineral development depends on the applicable legal framework and mineral rights. Brazil’s National Mining Agency explains this separation. Source: ANM, surface owners’ rights<\/a>.<\/p>\n

That does not make foreign investment irrelevant. An acquisition can change who decides on investment, sales destinations and the organization of production. But accurately describing a transaction is essential to assessing its reach.<\/p>\n

To claim that a particular country bought thousands of hectares to exploit rare earths, one would need to identify the properties, buyers, records and mineral connection. The examples documented in this article primarily demonstrate corporate control and access to supply<\/strong>, not a verified tally of Brazilian land purchased by foreign governments.<\/p>\n

There is also a difference between an exploration application and a mine. An application records interest in an area; it does not establish an economically recoverable reserve, environmental approval or permission to begin extraction. ANM describes exploration, mining and beneficiation as activities with distinct stages and regulatory frameworks. Source: ANM, mineral exploration and development<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Goi\u00e1s: the deal that brought Brazilian production closer to US strategy<\/h2>\n

On April 20, 2026, USA Rare Earth announced an agreement to acquire 100% of Serra Verde Group, owner of the Pela Ema mine and processing facility in Goi\u00e1s. The announcement put the deal’s value at approximately US$2.8 billion.<\/p>\n

The statement also described a 15-year offtake agreement with a structure backed by US government participants and private capital, including minimum prices for magnet elements. The interest therefore extended beyond the land or the ore still underground: it included the commercial destination of production. Source: USA Rare Earth, April 2026 announcement<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In a September 4 statement, the company said the combination had closed the previous day. The document dates the start of production at the Goi\u00e1s operation to January 2024 and sets out expansion targets. Those targets are company projections, not output already achieved. Source: USA Rare Earth, September 2026 announcement<\/a>.<\/p>\n

US public-sector involvement also appears in a document separate from the acquisition announcement: the US International Development Finance Corporation, DFC, reported signing a US$565 million<\/strong> loan to optimize and expand Pela Ema. The agency itself presented the project as part of building a Western-aligned source of rare earths. Source: DFC<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Together, these measures reveal an explicit industrial policy. Financing, corporate participation and purchase commitments can be combined to reduce a project’s risk and secure supply.<\/p>\n

\"Vila<\/p>\n

Vila de Furnas, Mina\u00e7u, Goi\u00e1s, in December 2010. This photograph provides context for the municipality; it does not show the Pela Ema mine. Photo: PradoJuliano \/ Wikimedia Commons<\/a>, CC BY 3.0<\/a>. Unmodified for this article.<\/em><\/p>\n

China also buys companies and secures future supply<\/h2>\n

One documented case concerns Australia’s Peak Rare Earths, associated with the Ngualla project in Tanzania. In May 2025, the company announced an acquisition agreement with a subsidiary of China’s Shenghe.<\/p>\n

The Australian Securities Exchange announcement stated that Shenghe was already a significant shareholder and held contractual rights to 100% of Ngualla’s rare earth production. The example shows how access to material can be negotiated even before a full acquisition is completed. Source: Peak’s ASX announcement<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In Brazil, Chinese involvement in mining includes CMOC’s 2016 purchase of niobium and phosphate businesses previously owned by Anglo American. The transaction appears in the company’s corporate history. It is a real mining acquisition, but it should not be described as a rare earth purchase: niobium and phosphate are different products.<\/strong> Source: CMOC acquisition history<\/a>.<\/p>\n

These cases do not justify attributing the same intention to every Chinese or American company. They do, however, reveal recurring tools: acquiring assets, financing their expansion and securing who will receive their output. Economic competition can advance through these tools without any formal change in borders.<\/p>\n

The US began guaranteeing prices and financing factories<\/h2>\n

The American response is also taking place inside the United States. In July 2025, MP Materials announced a partnership with the Department of Defense that included a US$400 million preferred-equity investment and a ten-year commitment to a US$110-per-kilogram price floor for certain neodymium-praseodymium products.<\/p>\n

The agreement also included mechanisms to purchase output from a new magnet factory. These measures are intended to make a supply chain commercially viable while it competes with established suppliers. Source: MP Materials partnership announcement<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In August 2025, the Department of Defense confirmed the execution of a US$150 million loan to add heavy rare earth separation capacity at Mountain Pass, California. Source: US Department of Defense<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The economic reasoning is clear: when a government considers an input essential to national security, it may accept costs and risks that private investors alone would not take on. The contest comes to involve public budgets, technological development and defense contracts, as well as market prices.<\/p>\n

\"Panoramic<\/p>\n

Mountain Pass, California: a historical view of the mine and its facilities on November 16, 2010. The photograph does not represent the operation’s current configuration. Photo: AlanM1 \/ Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 3.0<\/a>, unmodified for this article. Original file and authorship<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

Greenland and Ukraine: different territories, minerals and agreements<\/h2>\n

Greenland entered this discussion through Donald Trump’s statements about acquiring and controlling the territory. The chronology compiled by the Associated Press records remarks dating back to 2019, further statements in 2024 and 2025, and continuing tensions in 2026. Expressing interest, however, does not amount to a completed purchase. Source: AP chronology of the dispute<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In Ukraine, the instrument was different: an agreement to establish a joint investment and reconstruction fund, signed with the United States on April 30, 2025. The US Treasury confirmed its creation. Source: US Treasury<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Ukraine’s Economy Ministry said the country would retain ownership of its subsoil and natural resources. Describing the agreement simply as \u201cselling Ukrainian land to the US\u201d therefore omits its structure and contradicts Kyiv’s official explanation. Source: Ukraine’s Economy Ministry<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The three examples\u2014a corporate acquisition in Brazil, territorial ambitions in Greenland and an investment fund in Ukraine\u2014are not interchangeable. Combining them creates a simpler narrative, but one less faithful to the facts.<\/p>\n

\"View<\/p>\n

Nuuk, Greenland, in June 2025. This city view provides geographical context for the territory discussed in the geopolitical dispute; it does not show a mineral deposit. Photo: Quintin Soloviev \/ Wikimedia Commons<\/a>, CC BY 4.0<\/a>. Unmodified for this article.<\/em><\/p>\n

Where armed groups control rare earths: the case of Myanmar<\/h2>\n

The connection between strategic minerals and violence is tangible in Myanmar. A Global Witness investigation published in 2024 documented the expansion of heavy rare earth mining in Kachin State amid conflict and weak protection for communities.<\/p>\n

The organization estimated trade in these materials with China at US$1.4 billion in 2023 and reported impacts on water, farmland and residents. This is an investigation by an independent organization using its own methodology and sources; its conclusions should be attributed to it. Source: Global Witness investigation into Kachin<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In November 2024, the Associated Press reported that the Kachin Independence Army had captured Kanpaiti, an important border crossing and mining hub. The report described a network of unlicensed mines previously controlled by a militia and shipments to Chinese buyers. Source: AP report on the capture of the mining hub<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The case illustrates how controlling a road, a border crossing or a mine’s security can enable the collection of fees and influence over supply. But insurgent groups, regime-linked militias and criminal gangs are not identical categories. Each actor’s nature and responsibility must be investigated separately.<\/p>\n

The existence of this network also does not prove that every final buyer knows the origin of every shipment, or that every Chinese product contains illicit material. The relevant question is traceability: how can one establish where the mineral came from and which intermediaries were paid?<\/p>\n

\"Confluence<\/p>\n

The Mali and N\u2019mai rivers meet at Myitsone, Kachin State, Myanmar, in a photograph from 2018. This image provides regional context: it does not show a mine or document contamination or criminal activity. Photo: Thawng \/ Wikimedia Commons<\/a>, CC BY-SA 4.0<\/a>. Unmodified for this article.<\/em><\/p>\n

What about Brazil? Mining crime is documented, but not for every mineral<\/h2>\n

Brazil has documented cases of mineral extraction in areas dominated by criminal gangs. In September 2025, the Federal Police announced an operation in the Sarar\u00e9 Indigenous Territory, Mato Grosso, targeting illegal mining, illicit gold trading and organized crime. According to the police, gangs dominated the area; officers came under rifle fire, and weapons, explosives, gold and mercury were seized. Source: Brazilian Federal Police<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In Yanomami territory, government documents also describe efforts to disrupt the logistical chains supporting gold and cassiterite mining. Cassiterite is a tin ore, not a rare earth. Source: Brazil’s Ministry of Indigenous Peoples<\/a>.<\/p>\n

These facts establish the presence of organized crime in mining activities. They do not establish that the PCC or Comando Vermelho dominate Brazilian rare earth production, or that they control Serra Verde or other companies named in this article.<\/strong> The sources consulted did not provide sufficient documentation to support those specific allegations.<\/p>\n

The distinction does not diminish the problem. It avoids associating companies, workers or regions with crimes without evidence. Oversight of new projects can draw on lessons from illegal mining, especially concerning financing, intermediaries and the origin of funds, without assuming that every mining operation is criminal.<\/p>\n

Were US sanctions against Brazilians motivated by rare earths?<\/h2>\n

This is one of the most sensitive questions\u2014and it requires separating three subjects: tariffs on goods, financial sanctions against individuals or entities, and mineral negotiations.<\/p>\n

On July 30, 2025, the White House issued an order imposing an additional 40% tariff on certain Brazilian products, with exceptions. The text cited actions by Brazil’s government and judiciary, disputes involving US platforms and the treatment of Jair Bolsonaro. These were the Trump administration’s stated grounds. Source: White House executive order<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On the same date, the Treasury announced sanctions against Alexandre de Moraes based on allegations of rights violations and suppression of freedom of expression. The sanction’s existence is a documented fact; the characterization of the conduct reflects the US government’s allegations, not an independent finding by this article. Source: US Treasury, July 2025 decision<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Updating this history is essential: on December 12, 2025<\/strong>, OFAC recorded the removal of Moraes, his wife and Instituto Lex from the relevant sanctions list. Repeating the July news without this information would give an outdated impression. Source: OFAC, December 2025 removals<\/a>.<\/p>\n

A separate development came on July 1, 2026. A Treasury bulletin announced sanctions against two Brazilians and four companies\u2014three Brazilian and one Portuguese\u2014for alleged links to the PCC. The document tied the action to investigations involving money laundering and drug-trafficking proceeds. Source: official Treasury bulletin<\/a>.<\/p>\n

None of these documents demonstrates that the measures were intended to force Brazil to surrender mineral deposits. Nor do they establish a proven exchange of mineral concessions for the removal of sanctions.<\/p>\n

Does that end the geopolitical discussion? No. US interest in Brazilian minerals is documented by the financing and transactions described earlier. Strategic resources can increase a country’s importance in negotiations. A plausible inference is that minerals form part of the broader context of power and interests; claiming they were the hidden cause of sanctions requires additional evidence.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Coinciding dates, meetings or interests cannot replace a contract, an explicit statement or documentation connecting the decisions. Journalism can investigate the hypothesis without presenting it as an established discovery.<\/p>\n

Brazil has enormous reserves. That is not yet a complete industry<\/h2>\n

The US Geological Survey’s Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026<\/em> lists estimated Brazilian reserves of 21 million metric tons<\/strong>, expressed in rare earth oxide equivalent. That places Brazil among the world’s major reserve holders. Reserves are not tons already extracted or guaranteed revenue: developing them depends on technical and economic conditions. Source: USGS, 2026 edition<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Brazil’s geography is diverse. ANM lists deposits and occurrences associated with formations in Minas Gerais, Goi\u00e1s, S\u00e3o Paulo, Amazonas, Rio de Janeiro and Rond\u00f4nia, among other locations. This helps avoid another simplification: the issue is not confined to the Amazon. Source: ANM mineral summary<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Efforts are underway to develop industrial stages within Brazil. In May 2026, the Ministry of Mines and Energy reported a visit to the MagBras project in Lagoa Santa, focused on manufacturing, using and recycling rare earth permanent magnets. Its stated objective is to build domestic capabilities throughout that cycle. The project’s existence, however, does not demonstrate commercial self-sufficiency. Source: Ministry of Mines and Energy, MagBras project<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On the institutional front, Law No. 15,506, signed on September 16, 2026, established the National Policy for Critical and Strategic Minerals and a council for their industrialization. The Finance Ministry describes its direction as expanding research, beneficiation and processing in Brazil, reducing the focus on raw-material exports. Source: Brazil’s Finance Ministry<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The outcome will depend on implementation. A policy can announce objectives; readers should track factories actually built, technology absorbed, workers trained and products sold.<\/p>\n

The energy transition also leaves waste behind<\/h2>\n

Being useful to a low-emission technology does not automatically make a mineral’s extraction clean. The impact depends on the deposit, extraction method, reagents, water management and waste disposal.<\/p>\n

USGS studies describe environmental problems associated with rare earth processing and the presence of thorium and uranium in certain ores. These naturally occurring elements can require specific precautions for waste and exposure. The same composition or risk should not, however, be assumed for every deposit. Source: USGS technical study on rare earths<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Myanmar’s experience shows the cost of expanding supply without adequate protection for communities. The answer need not be a choice between technology and environmental protection. It should include origin verification, monitoring and accountability for damage, from the opening of an operation through its closure.<\/p>\n

For Brazil, a competitive project should also be assessed by what it leaves after extraction: water quality, land rehabilitation, industrial capacity and living conditions in the municipality. Export volumes are only part of the outcome.<\/p>\n

What to watch next<\/h2>\n

One way to assess the race without relying on slogans is to follow five concrete questions:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Who controls the operation?<\/strong> Identifying shareholders and financiers is more informative than looking only at the nationality associated with a company’s name.<\/li>\n
  2. Where does production go?<\/strong> A long-term purchase agreement can constrain the material’s commercial destination even without transferring ownership of the mine.<\/li>\n
  3. Where does processing take place?<\/strong> Extracting in Brazil and manufacturing the component abroad distributes jobs and expertise differently from domestic industrialization.<\/li>\n
  4. Who bears the risks?<\/strong> Public financing, price guarantees and incentives should be weighed against verifiable commitments in return.<\/li>\n
  5. Can the material be traced?<\/strong> Documented origins help distinguish lawful mining from networks associated with violence, fraud and environmental destruction.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    These criteria offer a way to analyze transactions, not a blanket accusation against foreign investors. They apply to Brazilian, Chinese, American and other companies alike.<\/p>\n

    The decisive contest takes place between the mine and the factory<\/h2>\n

    The race for rare earths is real. It involves acquisitions, public loans, supply agreements, export controls and conflicts in producing areas. The documentation allows these developments to be described without turning every negotiation into territorial conquest or every diplomatic crisis into proof of a mineral conspiracy.<\/p>\n

    Brazil has an opportunity to negotiate from a position supported by substantial resources and its own industrial initiatives. It also faces the risk of measuring success solely by the money announced and the ore leaving the country.<\/p>\n

    The question worth keeping in mind after the headlines is more demanding: how much of that wealth will become knowledge, production and decision-making capacity in Brazil?<\/strong><\/p>\n

    A deposit can put a country on the map of global interests. What it does between the mine and the factory helps determine its place on that map.<\/p>\n

    \n

    Reporting note: this article was prepared using public documents, corporate announcements, technical sources and investigations identified in the links. Announcements document what companies and governments stated; forecasts and allegations are attributed to their authors. No original interviews were conducted. The research did not find sufficient grounds to claim that criminal gangs control the Brazilian mining companies named here, or that mineral deposits were demonstrably exchanged for the removal of sanctions. Photographs are real, not AI-generated, with authorship and reuse conditions identified.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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